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Highlights
• The propensity to save for R&D firms in emerging economies is lower rather than
higher, which is contrary to the literature.
• The low propensity to save is due to the concentration of innovation amongst larger
and more mature firms in emerging markets that are likely to be unconstrained.
• Access to external finance is a major determinant of the propensity to save and
deterrent to investing in innovation.
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Abstract
Despite the surge in corporate savings and heightened interest in understanding
the reasons for this behaviour, little is known about the forces behind this stylised
phenomenon in emerging markets (EMs). Using a large sample of firms from nine
African countries over the period 2001–2015, we posit and find that the propensity
to save is higher in this context due to limited access to external finance. However,
when we examine the effects of innovation on corporate savings, we find that the
results are reversed as, relative to Non-R&D firms, R&D firms save less of their
operating cash flow. This is in stark contrast to the extant literature in advanced
economies, which shows that savings are essential to smoothen lumpy, irreversible
and risky investments in innovation. We find this is due to the reversal in firm-
specific factors, with R&D firms in this context being larger and more mature;
hence, relying less on internal financing sources compared to young and less-mature
R&D firms in advanced economies. We interpret our results as suggestive of the
overarching influence of access to external finance as a major determinant of the
propensity to save and deterrent to investing in innovation. Our finding helps
explain the glut in innovation amongst small and young firms in emerging markets
and calls for policies that promote innovation.
Keywords: The propensity to save, innovation, R&D, financial constraints, emerg-
ing markets, Africa.
JEL classification: G01; G31; G32.
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1 Introduction
There is an emerging consensus that corporate cash holdings have increased significantly
over the past decades due to the shift of economies from predominantly manufacturing
sectors (tangible capital) towards service and technology sectors (intangible or knowledge-
based capital).1 In line with this research theme, several studies in the US link the
high propensity to save or cash hoarding behaviour to the rise in innovation (for this
study, we use innovation and R&D, interchangeably) which is difficult to finance using
external sources as it is lumpy, irreversible, risky and has longer investment horizons (see
DMello et al., 2008; Brown and Petersen, 2011; He and Wintoki, 2016; Moshirian et al.,
2017). However, these findings may not be generalisable to other countries, especially
emerging markets saddled with several institutional deficiencies that not only limit access
to external finance (Ojah and Pillay, 2009; Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014; Guariglia and Yang,
2018), but also moderate how businesses are organised (George et al., 2016; Areneke et al.,
2019). We address this research gap using a large sample of publicly listed firms from
Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia
as an exemplification of emerging economies. Our choice is motivated by three main
reasons.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
First, of particular interest is not only the low levels of innovation, but also the lack of
comprehensive studies in emerging markets, yet, global innovation is increasing, and its
marginal benefits are much higher in emerging economies relative to developed economies
(George et al., 2016). Figure 1, which plots the average R&D-to-GDP (%) and the number
of researchers in R&D per million people, illustrates some interesting patterns in aggre-
gate innovation. Figure 1a which plots the R&D expenditure (% of GDP) shows that all
the nine African countries in our sample significantly lag behind exemplary countries such
as Japan, USA, Canada, France, UK, China and Italy. Similarly, Figure 1b shows lower
numbers of researchers in R&D per million people for most African countries, except for
1Several studies report marked increases in corporate innovation over time (e.g., Aghion et al., 2004;
Damodaran, 2009; Buera and Kaboski, 2012; Lim et al., 2014; Moshirian et al., 2017).
1
Tunisia, which ranks above Italy and China. These low levels of innovation are worrisome
given that the sustainability of economic growth in emerging markets is highly dependent
on the ability of firms to develop new innovative products and services (see Opperman
and Adjasi, 2017) as economies transit towards intangible or knowledge-based capital.
Interestingly, some African economies are ranked amongst the top nations based on eco-
nomic growth and contribution to global economic development over the past decade due
to the slowdown in advanced economies (Cumming et al., 2017). This highlights the
increasing influence of emerging economies on global policy and economic development,
which has spurred reforms aimed at attracting further foreign direct investments (FDI)
(Diao and McMillan, 2018). The increase in FDI, according to Bokpin (2017), should
help ease credit constraints and reduce the over-reliance on internal sources of finance for
firms operating in emerging markets.
Second, prior studies have shown that country-level peculiarities such as political in-
stitutions (Julio and Yook, 2012), culture (Chen et al., 2015) and investor protection
(Iskandar-Datta and Jia, 2014) significantly influence corporate cash holdings behaviour.
Similar to other emerging economies, firms in African countries operate within different
economic, cultural and political institutions compared to those in the West (Cumming
et al., 2017). Accordingly, the absence of enforcement of formal practices (institutional
voids), including property rights makes cultural and political institution significant in in-
fluencing firm behaviour (George et al., 2016). Drawing on George et al. (2016), institu-
tional voids in Africa manifest as weak market-supporting institutions, lack of specialised
financial intermediaries and absence of contract-enforcing structures and protection of
property rights. This, as argued by Guariglia and Yang (2018) for the case of Chinese
firms, makes non-intermediated or self-financing sources such as retained earnings and
cash reserves of prime importance to the survival and growth of firms in emerging mar-
kets. Unlike Western economies, where the financial markets operate efficiently, African
countries like other emerging markets have strong informal institutions that significantly
influence corporate practices (Julio and Yook, 2012; Tunyi et al., 2019). For example,
high levels of unethical practices such as corruption predominate (Thakor and Lo, 2015;
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Areneke and Kimani, 2019), and firms respond by hoarding cash to strategically benefit
from corrupting opportunities. Similarly, Barth et al. (2009) find that for firms to ac-
cess external finance, they may need to bribe bank officials, which further increases the
costs of external finance in this context. Therefore, these institutional peculiarities that
increase reliance on internal sources of finance make the African context an interesting
case study to validate theory, results from developed countries, and for developing new
theoretical frameworks.
Last, several studies find that access to financial markets is essential for innovation
(see Hall, 2002; Brown et al., 2012, 2013; Borisova and Brown, 2013). However, access to
external finance remains one of the most challenging issues in emerging markets (Asongu,
2017), more so, when firms are financing innovation (Brown et al., 2013). According to
Sorge et al. (2017), firms in an emerging market such as South Africa rely mostly on
short-term debt (49% of the total debt is short-term). Similarly, Cortina et al. (2017)
find significant short-termism in emerging markets, with only large firms being able to
issue long-term debt. This short-termism with its attendant roll-over and liquidity risks
is less suited for financing innovation, which is risky, costly and has relatively longer
investment horizons. These unique features of innovation (Brown et al., 2012) and the
limited financing options in emerging markets (Boako and Alagidede, 2018; Meniago and
Asongu, 2018) imply an increased reliance on internal sources of finance. This makes
the understanding of the propensity to save from operating cash flow within emerging
markets context an interesting research question.
In this study, we address the above lacuna by examining the savings behaviour of
publicly listed African firms. Specifically, we investigate the following questions: Do firms
in emerging markets save from operating cash flow (internally generated cash flow)? Does
innovation and financial constraints affect the propensity to save in emerging markets?
Using a large sample of 501 publicly listed non-utility and non-financial firms (5,570
firm-year observations) from nine African countries over the period 2001–2015, we find
as expected that the propensity to save from internally generated or operating cash flow
of 0.36 is three and a half-times higher than the average of 0.10 reported by Riddick
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and Whited (2009) for advanced economies.2 This finding implies a greater need to
enhance financial flexibility in less developed capital markets. However, contrary to
the extant literature in advanced economies (see Brown and Petersen, 2011, 2015; He
and Wintoki, 2016), we find that R&D firms in Africa save less relative to Non-R&D
firms. This somewhat puzzling finding suggests that R&D firms in emerging markets
have a lower need to accumulate cash reserves that are needed to smoothen innovation
in the presence of significant capital market frictions. We further confirm this finding
using endogenous switching regression models that account for the endogenous nature of
corporate decisions, which if ignored, as in the literature, could potentially bias inferences.
Our estimates using endogenous switching regression models affirm that R&D firms in
our sample have a lower propensity to save relative to Non-R&D firms. This result, which
remains unchanged even for comparisons conditional on financial constraints (constrained
versus unconstrained firms), suggests that hoarding cash is less valuable for R&D firms
relative to Non-R&D firms. The surprisingly low propensity to save for R&D firms in
our context is due to their markedly unique characteristics. R&D firms in Africa are
larger and more mature as opposed to the concentration of innovation among smaller
and younger firms in developed economies. Our results, more importantly, show that
access to external finance is a major factor that deters firms from investing in innovation
as only mature and larger firms, which have better access to capital markets, account for
most of the innovation in emerging markets.
This paper contributes to the extant literature along several dimensions. To the best
of our knowledge, we make the first attempt to comprehensively examine the effects of the
interplay between innovation and financial constraints on corporate savings, especially in
under-researched emerging market contexts that is markedly different from the US and
Europe where studies are concentrated. By focusing on emerging markets as exempli-
fied by African countries, we investigate whether the results in the extant literature are
generalisable within this setting where the need to save is of prime importance given the
limited access to external finance. Consistent with this narrative, we find that, on over-
2Riddick and Whited (2009) find that the propensity to save is 0.103, 0.053, 0.103, 0.141, 0.126 and
0.078 for United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Japan, France and Germany, respectively.
4
all, the accumulation of cash reserves is one of the most important corporate objectives
in emerging countries. However, we do not find supporting evidence for the increase in
savings with innovation as reported for firms in the developed world (see Brown and Pe-
tersen, 2015; He and Wintoki, 2016; Machokoto et al., 2019). Instead, we find an irregular
concentration of innovation amongst large and mature firms that have better access to
external finance; hence, the lower propensity to save relative to Non-R&D firms. In the
second instance, we show the overarching influence of the institutional environment on
cash holdings behaviour. Specifically, only firms with better access to external finance, as
indicated by the low propensity to save, invest in innovation. This helps explain the low
levels of innovation in Africa and highlights the need to enhance or improve the financing
of innovation that is essential for social and economic development. Finally, we provide
sharper tests of the effects of innovation on the propensity to save via endogenous switch-
ing regression models that account for the endogenous nature of the decision to save and
invest in innovation. Our results show that overlooking this form of endogeneity results
in overstated estimates of the propensity to save, thereby, leading to biased inferences.
The rest of our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the literature and
hypotheses. Section 3 presents the methodology and data. Section 5 presents and dis-
cusses the results. Section 6 presents the robustness tests, and Section 7 summaries and
concludes.
2 Literature review and hypotheses
In the absence of market frictions, as proposed by Modigliani and Miller (1958), there
is no divergence between the cost of internal and external funds, which dispenses with
the need to hoard or accumulate cash reserves (see Keynes, 1936). However, markets are
imperfect, especially emerging markets which are fraught with frictions such as informa-
tion asymmetry and agency costs that significantly increase the cost of external capital
relative to internal capital. This results in the adoption of a pecking order approach to
firm financing (see Myers, 1984), with internal funds being preferred to external funds;
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hence, the observed cash hoarding behaviour. Hoarding cash, however, entails a trade-off
between the benefits of enhancing financial flexibility and the forgone or postponed invest-
ments that in most cases have comparatively better returns than liquid assets (Khurana
et al., 2006).
Interestingly, as several studies document, firms are increasingly opting to hoard
cash, which enables them to pursue valuable investment opportunities without being
constrained by the availability of funds (see Gamba and Triantis, 2008; Marchica and
Mura, 2010; de Jong et al., 2012; Denis and McKeon, 2012; Ferrando et al., 2017; He and
Wintoki, 2016). Similarly, Khurana et al. (2006) find that cash holdings are inversely
related to financial development. This implies that hoarding cash is more pronounced in
developing or emerging markets where access to external finance is limited, and if avail-
able, it is costly and often accompanied by restrictive covenants (see Bae and Goyal, 2009;
Gwatidzo and Ojah, 2014; Amaeshi et al., 2016; Ding et al., 2016). Al-Najjar (2013) also
find that firms hold more cash reserves in environments characterised by low shareholder
protection. Collectively, this points to a higher need to enhance financial flexibility via
corporate savings, which in the context of emerging markets is mostly from internally
generated or operating cash flow. We, therefore, formulate and test the following hy-
pothesis:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Due to limited access to external finance, firms in emerging mar-
kets have high propensity to save from operating cash flow.
It is well-documented that firms hoard cash to finance valuable projects (Barth et al.,
2009; Bates et al., 2009; He and Wintoki, 2016). This hoarding behaviour is increasingly
being linked to the need to finance the boom in innovation as economies transit from
tangible to intangible or knowledge-based capital (Barth et al., 2009; Brown and Petersen,
2015; Qiu and Wan, 2015). For example, Bates et al. (2009), Falato and Sim (2014) and He
and Wintoki (2016) document significant cash hoarding for US firms with riskier balance
sheets and investment opportunities that are difficult to finance externally. Similarly, the
difficulties associated with the financing innovation are well-documented in the literature
(see Brown and Petersen, 2011; Brown et al., 2012; Brown and Petersen, 2015) and are
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more pronounced in less-developed economies (Brown et al., 2013, 2017). While the
above studies link the increase in corporate cash holdings to the rising innovation, to the
best of our knowledge, none examines this important nexus within an emerging market
context. Unlike the US and Europe where studies are concentrated, emerging markets
are uniquely different as they are characterised by several institutional inadequacies (see,
Asongu, 2017; Areneke and Kimani, 2019; Tunyi et al., 2019) which increase reliance
on internal funds to finance innovation. Following on the above discussion and pecking
order theory, we posit that firms in emerging markets have higher incentives to save from
operating cash flow, which enhances financial flexibility, thereby enabling the financing
of innovation. We, therefore, hypothesise that:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In emerging economies, the propensity to save from operating cash
flow increases with innovation.
The effect of credit constraints and channels through which they affect real decisions
are contentious issues (the credit constraints hypothesis) (see Fazzari et al., 1988; Kaplan
and Zingales, 1997; Erickson and Whited, 2000). Several studies show that firms hoard
cash when they face binding credit constraints (see Almeida et al., 2004; Denis and
Sibilkov, 2010). As credit constraints are binding in emerging markets (Khurana et al.,
2006), it is not unreasonable to expect a more pronounced cash hoarding behaviour for
financially constrained firms in this context, especially when they invest in innovation.
The financing of innovation is fraught with difficulties as it is irreversible, risky, has
longer investment horizons, and prone to asset substitution and information asymmetry
problems. These unique characteristics significantly increase the financing difficulties that
firms encounter, especially in the presence of binding credit constraints, as is the case in
emerging markets. This increases reliance on internal financing sources. Accordingly, we
formulate and test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The propensity to save increases with credit constraints and this
is more pronounced for R&D firms relative to Non-R&D firms in emerging economies.
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3 Methodology
To examine the propensity to save (cash flow sensitivity of cash), we estimate an aug-
mented version of the model of Almeida et al. (2004). We augment the model with an
R&D dummy (RDD), the interaction term of the R&D dummy and cash flow (CF ), and
further controls for firm financing and asset structure which affect the propensity to save
as follows:
∆Cashijkt =α + γCFijkt + ϕRDDijkt + ΥCFijkt × RDDijkt
+ βX ijkt−1 + ijkt (1)
where ∆Cashijkt is the change in cash holdings for firm i in industry j and country k
at time t, α is a constant, and γ, ϕ, Υ and β are coefficients to be estimated, CFijkt
is cash flow, RDDijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for firms that
report R&D and zero otherwise, X ijkt−1 is vectors of lagged firm-specific characteristics
explained below, νj and νt are country and time-fixed effects, and ijkt is the error term.
The vector, X ijkt−1, consists of Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total assets (Size), total debt
(TDA) and property, plant and equipment (PPE).3
Next, we examine the effects of innovation and credit constraints on the propensity to
save using endogenous switching regression models. The advantage of using endogenous
switching regression models is that we simultaneously account for the endogenous nature
of the decisions to invest in innovation and save from operating cash flow, which are non-
random decisions, and if overlooked as in the literature, can lead to biased inferences.4
The model takes the form of a system of three equations that are estimated simultaneously
3The choice of the determinants of the change in cash is informed by the literature (e.g., Almeida
et al., 2004; Khurana et al., 2006; He and Wintoki, 2016).
4If innovation and corporate savings are non-random decisions, we cannot expect the propensity to
save to be similar or the same for R&D and Non-R&D firms. Consistent with this prediction, our results
estimating Equation (1), and Equations (2)–(4) show that overlooking this form of endogeneity leads to
biased inferences as the estimates of the propensity to save are significantly overstated.
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via full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) as follows:-
∆Cash1ijkt = α1 + γ1CF1ijkt + θ1FC1ijkt + λ1CF1ijkt × FC1ijkt
+ β1X 1ijkt−1 + 1ijkt iff y
∗
ijkt < 0 (2)
∆Cash2ijkt = α2 + γ2CF2ijkt + θ2FC1ijkt + λ2CF1ijkt × FC1ijkt
+ β2X 2ijkt−1 + 2ijkt iff y
∗
ijkt ≥ 0 (3)
I∗ijkt = ζZ ijkt−1 + µijkt (4)
where ∆Cash1ijkt and ∆Cash2ijkt are the changes in cash holdings for firm i in regime (1)
and regime (2), respectively. α is a constant, and γ, θ, λ, β and ζ are coefficients to be
estimated. FC1ijkt is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is categorised
as being financially constrained in a particular year and otherwise zero. ijkt and µijkt
are error terms. The vector of lagged firm-specific factors, X ijkt−1, is the same as in
Equation (1). Z ijkt−1 is the vector of variables that determine the probability, I∗ijkt, of
being in regime (1) or (2). The vector Z ijkt−1 consists of Tobin’s q, the logarithm of total
assets (Size), total debt (TDA) and property, plant and equipment (PPE), dividends
(Dividend) and cash holdings (Cash). To identify constrained firms, we use four widely
accepted measures of financial constraints; size, tangibility, firm-age, and WW Index
(Whited, 2006). Following Almeida et al. (2004), we categorise a firm as constrained
(FCijkt) in each year if it is in the lower three deciles of the distribution of firm-size
and tangibility and in the top three deciles of the WW Index (Whited, 2006). For the
categorisation based on firm-age, we classify a firm as financially constrained if its age is
below the median firm-age.
We estimate Equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) with fixed effects (see
Almeida et al., 2004; Khurana et al., 2006) and general method of moments (GMM5)
of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002) which is based on higher-order moments to correct
for potential measurement errors, and Equations (2)–(4) via full-information maximum
likelihood (FIML) (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). For robustness, we also estimate a modified
version of our baseline model using the dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent
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variable (DPF) estimator (see Elsas and Florysiak, 2011, 2015), difference general method
of moments (DIFF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system general method of
moments (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This enables us to account for the
dynamic nature of corporate decisions and endogeneity issues that can potentially bias
our inferences.
4 Data
Our sample is composed of publicly listed firms from Egypt, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya,
Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The data is drawn from Datastream
over the period 2001–2015. We exclude financial and utility firms, and firms with negative
equity and missing data on key variables (such as total assets and total revenue). We
exclude firms with more than 100% growth in assets to avoid potential biases caused by
abnormal growth or merger and acquisitions. We replace all missing R&D observations
with zero. To reduce the effects of outliers, we winsorise all variables at the upper and
bottom 1%. Our final sample consists of 5,570 firm-year observations for 501 firms, of
which 108 firms (1,332 firm-year observations) report R&D. We describe, in detail, each
of the variables used in Table 1.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 1 HERE
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all firms, Non-R&D and R&D firms. The
mean (median) change in cash (∆Cash) and cash flow (CF ) is 1.8% (0.8%) and 18.2%
(16%) with a standard deviation of 7.3% and 11.5%, respectively. These basic statistics
are comparable to those in the literature. Table 1 shows that R&D firms have, on average,
higher cash flow (CF ), size (Size), total debt (TDA) and firm-age (Firm-Age), while
they have lower Tobin’s q, property, plant and equipment (PPE), dividends (Dividend)
and cash (Cash) relative to Non-R&D firms. These summary statistics suggest that R&D
firms in Africa significantly differ from those in the USA which are smaller, younger and
have low operating cash flow (see Brown et al., 2009, 2012; Brown and Petersen, 2015).
These prima facie differences suggest that, relative to Non-R&D firms, R&D firms in
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Africa are less likely to face binding credit constraints as they are larger, more mature
and have higher leverage (debt).
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 2 HERE
Table 2 presents the Spearman (above diagonal) and Pearson (below diagonal) pair-
wise correlations for all variables used in our analyses. ∆Cash is positively correlated
with cash flow (CF ), while it is negatively correlated with Tobin’s q, size (Size), total
debt (TDA), property, plant and equipment (PPE), dividend (Dividend), cash (Cash)
and firm-age (Firm-Age). The correlations are as expected and in line with the liter-
ature, except for the change in cash, which appears to contradict Brown and Petersen
(2015) and He and Wintoki (2016).5
5 Results
In Table 3, we estimate several variants of Equation (1). Columns (1)–(5) of Table 3
present the estimation results for the full sample excluding the RDD and CF × RDD.
Columns (2) and (6) present the results for Non-R&D firms, while Columns (3) and (7)
present the results for R&D firms. Columns (4) and (8) present the results, including
RDD and CF × RDD. Using this approach enables us to directly test whether the
propensity to save is statistically different between R&D and Non-R&D firms. Table 3
summarises the results.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 3 HERE
Table 3 shows that all the coefficients of cash flow are positive and statistically sig-
nificant. Column (1) shows that, on average, a firm in Africa has a propensity to save
of 0.363. This suggests that a firm increases cash holdings by 0.0408 for a one standard
deviation increase in operating cash flow. We find a similar, but higher estimate of the
propensity to save of 0.399 based on GMM5, which shows that our results are robust
5Brown and Petersen (2015) and He and Wintoki (2016) find a positive relationship between cash
and innovation (R&D) as firms use cash holdings to smoothen innovation.
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to the choice of the estimation technique and mismeasurement errors associated with
Tobin’s q. Our results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 (H1) and in line with Almeida
et al. (2004) and Chen and Chen (2012) who find significant positive cash flow sensitivity
of cash and investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms in the US, respectively. However,
our estimates are relatively higher than those reported for US firms, which implies that
maintaining financial flexibility by hoarding cash, is one of the primary objectives of firms
operating in emerging markets where access to external finance is limited. The higher
propensity to save that we document indicates the presence of binding credit constraints
to which firms respond by saving most of the operating cash flow as a way of hedging
against future shortfalls.
The coefficients of the interaction term, CF ×RDD, in Columns (4) and (8) of Table
3, are negative and significant, which suggests that R&D firms save relatively less than
Non-R&D firms. Specifically, for a one standard deviation increase in cash flow, R&D
firms save 0.009 and 0.004 less than Non-R&D firms for estimates via FE and GMM5,
respectively. This finding is contrary to the literature (Brown and Petersen, 2015; He
and Wintoki, 2016) and our predictions in Hypothesis 2 (H2), that the propensity to save
increases with innovation. Our results show that the observed stylised cash hoarding
behaviour in emerging economies is not driven by changes in corporate innovation.
We next explore the reasons why R&D firms save relatively less than Non-R&D firms
by examining the effects of credit constraints on the propensity to save. As noted earlier,
prior studies on innovation overlook the endogeneity relating to the decision to invest in
innovation and save from operating cash flow (e.g., Brown and Petersen, 2011; Borisova
and Brown, 2013; He and Wintoki, 2016). To address this limitation, we use endogenous
switching regression models that enable us to simultaneously test for the effects of finan-
cial constraints on real decisions while accounting for the endogenous nature of corporate
decisions. Table 4 presents the results estimating Equations (2)–(4) via full-information
maximum likelihood (FIML).
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Our results show that the coefficients of cash flow, in Table 4, are significantly lower
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than those in Table 3. This confirms our prediction that the decision to invest in inno-
vation and save cash are endogenous, and that if this form of endogeneity is overlooked
as in the extant literature, the results should be interpreted with caution. Column (1)
of Table 4 shows that R&D firms consistently save less than Non-R&D firms. This is in-
consistent with Hypothesis 2 (H2) and the extant literature in advanced economies (e.g.
Brown and Petersen, 2011, 2015; He and Wintoki, 2016). Instead, our results suggest
that R&D firms in Africa do not prioritise savings from operating cash flow (financial
flexibility). This is somewhat puzzling and surprising, given that these firms operate in
emerging markets where access to external finance is limited. As a result, we next explore
the reasons for these puzzling findings by augmenting our initial model to include several
proxies of financial constraints.
Columns (2)–(4) of Table 3 consistently show that Non-R&D firms have a higher
propensity to save when they face binding credit constraints. This is in line with Hy-
pothesis 3 (H3) and the credit constraint hypothesis, which predicts that firms hoard cash
when they face binding financial constraints. However, the effect of financial constraints
on the propensity to save from operating cash flow is lower and marginally significant
for R&D firms. This result, when taken together with those in the previous section,
suggests that R&D firms in our context rely less on internal sources of finance relative to
Non-R&D firms. Table 1 corroborates this result and shows that R&D firms are larger,
mature, and have more tangible assets, which facilitates better access to external finance.
This is more pertinent in emerging markets, given that firms operating in this context
rely mostly on short-term debt and bank loans for their borrowings (Sorge et al., 2017).
In summary, our results show that R&D firms in Africa save less of their operating
cash flow as they are markedly different from those in the developed world. R&D firms
in emerging markets are mostly larger, mature, and have more tangible assets. This
implies that access to external finance is a major determinant of innovation; hence, the
low number of small and young firms reporting R&D in emerging markets.
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6 Robustness
In this section, we implement a battery of robustness tests. We first examine the time-
variations in the propensity to save by estimating 5-year rolling regressions of Equation
(1), excluding the RDD and CF × RDD. We estimate this modified version of our
baseline model separately for all firms, innovative and non-innovative firms. Figure 2
plots the coefficients of cash flow over the sample period.
PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE
Figure 2 shows consistent and persistent differences in the propensity to save between
R&D firms (RDD = 1) and Non-R&D firms (RDD = 0). Firms that invest in innova-
tion consistently save less from operating cash flow relative to Non-R&D firms. This is
consistent with our previous results, but inconsistent with Brown et al. (2009) and He
and Wintoki (2016) for US firms. Instead, our results suggest that R&D firms in Africa
have a less pressing need to save from operating cash flow relative to Non-R&D firms.
This puzzling finding is due to the markedly different firm-specific characteristics of R&D
firms in Africa relative to those in developed economies that are mostly younger, smaller
and have less-pledgeable assets.6 Relative to Non-R&D firms, R&D firms in Africa are
larger, mature and have more pledgeable assets, which makes it easier to access capital
markets, thereby reducing the need to save or hold large cash reserves. This is in contrast
to the corporate universe of R&D firms in developed markets - mostly smaller, younger,
and with less-tangible assets - which increases their need to save or hoard cash in a bid
to hedge against future shortfalls.7
We also examine the sensitivity of our results to alternative model specifications and
choice of estimation techniques. To ensure the robustness of our results, we estimate a
modified version of Equation (1) that includes the lagged change in cash (∆Cashijkt−1)
6Appendix A shows similar results for cross-industrial analyses, expect for the telecommunication and
technology sector (T&T) where R&D firms save more than Non-R&D firms.
7Figure 3 also shows that the propensity to save is non-linear and consistently lower for R&D firms
relative to Non-R&D firms conditional on the distribution of the changes in cash. This confirms our
main results and shows that the differences in the propensity to save conditional on innovation are not
driven by differences in the firm’s ability to generated cash flow.
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as an additional determinant of the changes in cash holdings. We estimate this modi-
fied dynamic panel data model using the Dynamic Fractional Dependent Variable (DPF,
thereon) estimator of Elsas and Florysiak (2011, 2015), difference general method of mo-
ments (DIFF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system general method of moments
(SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998). This modified model enables us to account for
the dynamic nature of corporate decisions and address endogeneity concerns that could
potentially bias our inferences. In order to check the validity and relevance of our in-
struments, we present the Hansen-Sargan and second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) tests
for difference general method of moments (DIFF-GMM) and system general method of
moments (SYS-GMM). Table 5 summarises the results.
PLEASE INSERT TABLE 5 HERE
Table 5 confirms the validity and relevance of our instruments for the estimates based
on difference general method of moments (DIFF-GMM) and system general method of
moments (SYS-GMM) as both Hansen-Sargan and second-order autocorrelation (AR(2))
tests show no significant evidence of serial correlation. Our results, most importantly,
show that African firms save between 36% to 40% of the operating cash flow, which
is consistent with our previous results and the need to hedge against future shortfalls.
However, the interaction term CF ×RDD is consistently negative and significant, which
shows that R&D firms save less irrespective of the model specification or estimation
technique used. This confirms our previous findings and suggests that R&D firms in
Africa are uniquely larger, more mature and do not prioritise the accumulation of cash
reserves relative to Non-R&D firms.8 Based on the above tests, we conclude that our
results are robust to endogeneity issues that plague research in corporate finance.
Overall our results show consistent and persistent differences in the propensity to save
conditional on innovation, which suggests that access to external finance in emerging
8Following on the findings of Koh and Reeb (2015) that missing R&D is not equivalent to zero R&D,
we use RDD2, a dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm increases its intangible assets
and otherwise zero, as an alternative proxy for innovation. Appendix B shows that our results are
robust to changing the way we define innovation as R&D firms consistently save less than Non-R&D
firms. However, we acknowledge that our results may be affected by the selective reporting of R&D and
the lack of comprehensive alternative firm-level measures of innovation within the context of emerging
markets.
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markets is a major factor deterring small and young firms from investing in innovation.
7 Summary discussion and conclusion
There is a growing interest in understanding the effects of innovation on corporate deci-
sions given the transition of economies from predominantly manufacturing towards tech-
nology and services industries. Virtually all of the literature on innovation and its impact
on corporate decisions is concentrated in advanced economies. This is partly due to the
lack of data and low levels of innovation in emerging economies. However, improvements
in data availability and disclosure of corporate innovation have recently amplified calls
for a concerted research effort to address this lacuna. This is of interest to academics,
practitioners and policymakers alike as results from developed economies may not be
generalisable in a context characterised by institutional inadequacies and limited access
to capital markets. These unique peculiarities adversely affect the financing of innovation
which is risky, irreversible, has longer investment horizons, and prone to asset substitution
and information asymmetry problems.
In line with the literature in the developed world, we find a high propensity to save
amongst firms operating in emerging markets, which suggests that enhancing financial
flexibility is increasingly becoming one of the most critical goals for firms operating in
emerging capital markets. However, our estimates of the propensity to save are lower
when we account for the potential bias emanating from the endogenous nature of the
decision to invest in innovation and save from operating cash flow using endogenous
switching regression models. This finding shows that overlooking the endogenous nature
of the two corporate decisions, as in the extant literature, leads to biased inferences on
the propensity to save. Interestingly, after addressing this potential bias, we find that
R&D firms in emerging economies save less than Non-R&D firms, which is not in line
with the extant literature in developed economies. Our results further show that the
propensity to save increases with financial constraints only for Non-R&D firms, which
confirms the markedly different firm-specific characteristics of R&D firms in emerging
16
economies to those in advanced economies, as the former are larger and more mature.
These differences reduce reliance on corporate savings to finance innovation in the context
of emerging markets.
Our findings have two important implications. First, and more importantly, our
results show that innovation is mostly concentrated amongst firms that are likely to
be less constrained - large and mature firms - which implies that improving access to
external finance can significantly boost innovation for small and young firms in emerging
economies. Second, we highlight the need to address endogeneity in corporate finance
research that can lead to biased inferences as our results show that models in the extant
literature significantly overstate the propensity to save from operating cash flow.
We acknowledge that our results may be affected by the selective reporting of R&D
and the lack of comprehensive alternative firm-level measures of innovation in the sampled
emerging markets. We highlight using alternative proxies of innovation such as patents
and citations as a future research endeavour.
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Figure 1 Cross-country variations in research and development
The figures present plots the R&D expenditure (% of GDP) and Researchers in R&D (per million people) across countries
over the period 1990–2015. The data is drawn from the World Bank.
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Figure 2 Time variations in the propensity to save
The figure plots the proportion of firms investing in innovation and average innovation over time. The sample consists of
publicly listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa,
Tunisia and Zambia. The data is drawn from Datastream over the period 2001–2015. All variables used are defined in
Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Figure 3 The propensity to save conditional on the changes in cash
The figures present plots the propensity to save at various quantiles. The sample consists of publicly listed non-utility and
non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The
data is drawn from Datastream over the period 2001–2015. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at
the lower and upper one percentiles.
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Table 4 The estimation of endogenous switching regression models
The table presents the results estimating Equations (2)–(4), the endogenous switching regression models, relating the
change in cash to firm-specific factors. The endogenous switching regression models with unknown sample separation are
estimated via maximum likelihoods. The sample consists of publicly listed non-utility and non-financial firms from Ivory
Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The data is drawn from Datastream
over the period 2001–2015. All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one
percentiles. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
Financial Constraint None Size Tangibility WW Index Firm-Age
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
R
D
D
=
0
CF 0.326*** 0.296*** 0.298*** 0.283*** 0.280***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.020)
FC -0.009* -0.003 -0.009* -0.018***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
CF×FC 0.079*** 0.108*** 0.115*** 0.069***
(0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.024)
Tobin’s q -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.019***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Size 0.001 0.002** 0.001** 0.003*** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
TDA -0.019*** -0.018** -0.018** -0.019*** -0.017**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
PPE -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.013* -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant -0.007 -0.022 -0.020* -0.018 0.034***
(0.011) (0.016) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
R
D
D
=
1
CF 0.191*** 0.175*** 0.186*** 0.170*** 0.171***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.029) (0.021) (0.028)
FC -0.014 0.004 -0.009 -0.015***
(0.009) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
CF×FC 0.076* 0.009 0.087** 0.040
(0.046) (0.028) (0.041) (0.029)
Tobin’s q -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Size 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TDA 0.102*** 0.105*** 0.100*** 0.105*** 0.105***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
PPE -0.092*** -0.091*** -0.083*** -0.092*** -0.091***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026)
Constant -0.439*** -0.435*** -0.440*** -0.443*** -0.420***
(0.065) (0.067) (0.064) (0.065) (0.063)
S
w
it
ch
in
g
fu
n
ct
io
n
Tobin’s q -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.132*** -0.136*** -0.138***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Size 0.207*** 0.209*** 0.206*** 0.210*** 0.208***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022)
TDA 0.824*** 0.830*** 0.831*** 0.833*** 0.841***
(0.279) (0.278) (0.279) (0.277) (0.278)
PPE 0.824*** 0.830*** 0.831*** 0.833*** 0.841***
(0.279) (0.278) (0.279) (0.277) (0.278)
Dividend 0.988*** 0.955*** 0.923*** 0.904*** 0.983***
(0.324) (0.315) (0.353) (0.312) (0.318)
Cash 1.746*** 1.774*** 1.771*** 1.795*** 1.831***
(0.389) (0.379) (0.406) (0.367) (0.402)
Constant -3.847*** -3.873*** -3.838*** -3.884*** -3.874***
(0.352) (0.354) (0.352) (0.354) (0.354)
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s
N 5,921 5,921 5,921 5,921 5,921
Log-Likelihood 4,914.00 4,924.00 4,947.00 4,939.00 4,926.00
/lns0 -2.694*** -2.694*** -2.701*** -2.695*** -2.694***
/lns1 -2.104*** -2.100*** -2.104*** -2.100*** -2.099***
/r0 0.572*** 0.588*** 0.569*** 0.603*** 0.584***
/r1 2.052*** 2.070*** 2.052*** 2.073*** 2.076***
χ2 270.10 278.40 253.60 283.50 268.20
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Differences
γ1 = γ2 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
γ1 + λ1 = γ2 + λ2 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.000
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Table 5 Alternative estimations of the effects of innovation on the propensity
to save
The table presents the estimation results of a modified version of Equation (1) that relates the change in cash to the
lagged change in cash (∆Cashijkt−1) and firm-specific factors. The sample consists of publicly listed non-utility and
non-financial firms from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The
data is drawn from Datastream over the period 2001–2015. The results are estimated using unbalanced dynamic panel
data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF) estimator (see Elsas and Florysiak, 2011, 2015), difference general method
of moments (DIFF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and system general method of moments (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and
Bond, 1998). All variables used are defined in Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. τ2 is an
index of measurement quality of Tobin’s q which ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating a poor proxy and one
indicating a very good proxy. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
DPF DIFF-GMM SYS-GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆Cashijkt−1 -0.047*** -0.045*** 0.229 0.254 0.514 0.525
(0.014) (0.014) (0.243) (0.253) (0.367) (0.363)
CF 0.395*** 0.415*** 0.381*** 0.418*** 0.361*** 0.390***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.035) (0.045) (0.026) (0.033)
RDD 0.015** 0.050*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.017) (0.012)
CF×RDD -0.098*** -0.159*** -0.131***
(0.027) (0.054) (0.043)
Tobin’s q -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.002 -0.001 -0.017*** -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Size -0.008** -0.008** -0.098*** -0.098*** -0.003*** -0.004***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.028) (0.028) (0.001) (0.001)
TDA -0.003 -0.003 0.069** 0.055* -0.007 -0.012
(0.015) (0.015) (0.030) (0.029) (0.010) (0.010)
PPE 0.164*** 0.167*** 0.636*** 0.647*** 0.046* 0.050*
(0.018) (0.018) (0.144) (0.150) (0.026) (0.027)
Constant 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.006 0.007
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
N 5,921 5,921 5,206 5,206 5,921 5,921
Firms 715 715 715 715 715 715
ρ2 0.030 0.030
σu 0.012 0.012
σe 0.067 0.067
Log-Likelihood 2,829 2,835
AR(2) p-value 0.243 0.225 0.095 0.084
J p-value 0.237 0.224 0.309 0.289
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Appendix B Alternative measure of innovation
The table presents the estimation results of a modified version of Equation (1) that relates the change in cash to the lagged
change in cash (∆Cashijkt−1) and firm-specific factors. RDD2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm
increases its intangible assets and otherwise zero. The sample consists of publicly listed non-utility and non-financial firms
from Ivory Coast, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zambia. The data is drawn from
Datastream over the period 2001–2015. The results are estimated using fixed effects (FE), general method of moments
(GMM5) of Erickson and Whited (2000, 2002), unbalanced dynamic panel data with a fractional dependent variable (DPF)
estimator (see Elsas and Florysiak, 2011, 2015), difference general method of moments (DIFF-GMM) (Arellano and Bond,
1991) and system general method of moments (SYS-GMM) (Blundell and Bond, 1998). All variables used are defined in
Table 1 and are winsorised at the lower and upper one percentiles. τ2 is an index of measurement quality of Tobin’s q
which ranges between zero and one, with zero indicating a poor proxy and one indicating a very good proxy. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
FE GMM5 DPF SYS-GMM SYS-GMM
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆Cashijkt−1 -0.052*** 0.111 0.486
(0.015) (0.207) (0.344)
CF 0.403*** 0.414*** 0.425*** 0.420*** 0.387***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.016) (0.036) (0.028)
RDD2 -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.025***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
RDD2×CF -0.083*** -0.014 -0.088*** -0.104*** -0.059**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.019) (0.027) (0.030)
Tobin’s q -0.013*** -0.038*** -0.008*** -0.000 -0.016***
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size -0.011*** 0.007** -0.006* -0.081*** -0.003***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.023) (0.001)
TDA 0.013 -0.011 0.011 0.069** -0.008
(0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.011)
PPE 0.226*** 0.206*** 0.188*** 0.607*** 0.044*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.126) (0.025)
N 5,921 5,921 5,206 5,206 5,921
Firms 715 715 715 715 715
R2 0.28
ρ2 0.282 0.049
τ2 0.403
σu 0.015
σe 0.064
Log-Likelihood 2,622
AR(2) p-value 0.367 0.081
J p-value 0.566 0.624
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